Special and Differential Treatment in the GATT: A Pyrrhic Victory for Developing Countries by Christie, Andrew
Volume 10 Number 2 2009/p. 63-84  esteyjournal.com 
 
 
Editorial Office: 410 22
nd St. E., Suite 820, Saskatoon, SK, Canada, S7K 5T6. _____ 




Special and Differential Treatment in 




Candidate for Baccalaureate in Laws, University of Ottawa 
Preferential measures for developing countries implemented within the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade failed to achieve their purported goal of facilitating 
economic development; this failure was due to their weak theoretical underpinnings 
and poor policy design. Not only were the demands developing countries made for 
discriminatory preferences largely ineffectual, their demands for preferential treatment, 
together with their forgoing full participation in the multilateral trading system, 
fundamentally reduced the obligation of developed countries to consider the interests 
of developing countries in future negotiation rounds. Thus the winning of preferences 
was rendered a pyrrhic victory for developing countries.   
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1. Historical Context and Rationale 
1.1 The Analytical Foundation and Purpose of the GATT 
he purpose of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was to raise 
the living standards of its members through the continuous reduction of trade 
barriers and the dismantling of discriminatory trade policies. The conceptual 
underpinning was the idea of a Ricardian competitive market equilibrium referred to 
as a Pareto optimal state, which aims to maximize welfare through economic 
specialization and through the exploitation of comparative advantage. At this 
equilibrium, “any deviation … if it raises welfare of someone somewhere, would do 
so only at the expense of someone else” (Srinivasan, 2005, 76). Tariffs and other 
restrictive barriers “prevent global market integration [and], ipso facto, prevent the 
equilibrium in such segmented markets from being Pareto optimal” (Srinivasan, 2005, 
76). 
This theoretical framework was operationalized through the two pillars of non-
discrimination and reciprocity, as evidenced by the most favoured nation (MFN) 
principle in the GATT, which ensured that all contracting members were afforded the 
best tariff rates offered (i.e., the rates offered to the most favoured nation). Reciprocity 
guaranteed export market access in return for import liberalization, a key 
counterweight in overcoming challenges of a political economy nature to international 
trade liberalization. Such challenges typically see minority production interests 
lobbying for protection at the cost of consumers, who stand to benefit from 
liberalization but suffer from collective action problems. The permanency and 
reliability of the GATT sent signals to market actors of predictability and 
transparency, both of which are crucial in creating a ripe investment climate, as they 
serve to reduce risk concerns among investors (Crook, 1990). The GATT’s structure 
tried to create a mechanism that would be universally beneficial in improving living 
standards through increased international trade. 
1.2 Rationale for Derivations toward Special and Differential 
Treatment 
Friedrich List, a 19
th century political economist, argued that an economically liberal 
environment (such as the GATT promotes) is not universally beneficial since it only 
serves the interests of already industrialized countries (List, 1966). He favoured tariff 
protection and manufacturing support in poorer countries, to allow time for 
industrialization. The emphasis on the gap between rich and poor countries lies at the 
heart of the theoretical framework underpinning special and differential treatment 
(S&DT) in the GATT. List’s arguments set the theoretical framework for S&DT 
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insofar as they support the claim that developing countries (DCs) merit separate 
treatment on the basis that they are different from developed countries. The logic of 
List’s argument is taken up by contemporary economists such as Bairoch (1993) and 
Chang (2002), who use past findings to explain 19
th century patterns of economic 
growth. They both argue that countries such as Britain grew relatively slowly as a 
result of low tariffs, whereas countries such as the United States, Canada and 
Argentina grew relatively quickly as a result of protecting infant industries through 
high tariffs. 
Specifically, the GATT framework for S&DT was supported by the claim that, 
relative to developed countries, DCs faced inter alia six principal challenges that 
prevented economic development: relatively unfavourable terms of trade; small share 
of world trade; low capital stock; minimal technology base; infrastructure weaknesses; 
and supply-side constraints as well as weak institutional and administrative capacity 
(Bartel, 2005; Myrdal, 1968). Since DCs mainly exported raw materials and other 
low–value added goods and imported higher technology manufactures from developed 
countries, their terms of trade were disadvantageous and would continue to be so, as 
the price of commodities historically was shown to fall relative to manufactures 
(Prebisch, 1950; Singer, 1950). 
As a result of these obstacles, the benefits of regular GATT membership, such as 
reciprocal tariff concessions, were purported not to enhance the welfare of DCs 
insofar as competition between DCs and developed countries was not realistic due to 
the head start the latter possessed with respect to industrialization. These structural 
restraints would thwart DC efforts to overcome supply-side constraints and to capture 
the economies of scale necessary to foster internationally competitive industries. DCs 
required structural transformation of their economies, not simply growth. This 
transformation was to be facilitated through S&DT in congruence with domestic 
economic programs of import substitution industrialization (ISI) to jumpstart 
economic development and conserve scarce foreign exchange needed to pursue 
economic development. 
Since inward-focused industrialization schemes would result in higher short-term 
prices for domestically produced manufactures, S&DT was required to create a 
temporary advantage until DCs were able to produce competitive exports. Given these 
pessimistic assumptions for exports, foreign exchange was assumed to be permanently 
in short supply. Given the GATT’s core competency in international trade, policy 
makers identified the GATT as being able to assist DCs in trade-related capacities to 
facilitate economic development, along with loans from other international 
organizations and direct international aid. To this end, the GATT was identified as Andrew Christie 
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being able to best assist DCs by allowing import restrictions and granting preferential 
market access. 
2. Reconsidering the Rationale for Preferential 
Measures 
imilar to the way in which further analysis demonstrates that Chang’s (2002) and 
Bairoch’s (1993) arguments misinterpret historical precedent, a deeper 
consideration of the rationale for preferential policies reveals weaknesses and ill-
considered assumptions. 
2.1 Market Failures in DCs: Justifying Preferences? 
S&DT justifications claimed that since DCs repeatedly demonstrated market failure 
tendencies, the causal link between trade and economic development was faulty. 
While those who argued for S&DT accurately identified challenges faced by DCs, 
their arguments related to how trade liberalization may hamper economic 
development were overblown and misconceived. The measures encompassed by 
S&DT were poorly suited to overcome the identified problems, as they often did not 
deal directly with the sources of market failures. As will be demonstrated below, an 
important element of S&DT, the use of trade restrictions, proceeded from a weak 
theoretical base. 
2.2 Protection through Import Restrictions 
Balance of payments (BOP) problems were argued to be a major underlying cause of 
the symptoms facing DCs (GATT, 1958). DCs lacked knowledge and experience 
regarding the important role of exchange rates needed to maintain necessary 
conditions for trade. Furthermore, within the ISI production framework pursued by 
many DCs, foreign currency was assumed to be scarce. BOP fluctuations could 
therefore be acutely problematic for infant industries in DCs that relied on foreign-
made inputs. 
S&DT attempted to protect infant industries by means of temporary import 
restrictions during BOP crises through Article XVIII (B).
2 Specifically, this article 
allowed for trade restrictions to reduce short-term outflows of foreign exchange, while 
providing a DC with time to perform macroeconomic adjustments and facilitate 
development (Eglin, 1987). In a broader context, Article XVIII (B) was a concrete 
response to the perceived challenges articulated by Bartel (2005) and Myrdal (1968) 
and faced uniquely by DCs, as outlined above in section 1. Developed countries, it 
was argued, possessed none of these challenges and as a result were structurally 
favoured by the existing economic order. Upon further analysis, however, the 
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economic logic underlying restrictions is weak, and such measures are ill suited to 
achieve the intended goal of a stabilized BOP framework. 
Fundamentally, restrictions do not deal with the “disequilibrium between national 
output and expenditure … (as) they switch expenditure from one group of imports to 
another, … to domestically-produced import substitutes … (and) to goods that would 
otherwise have been exported” (Eglin, 1987, 2). In other words, restrictions do not 
reduce expenditure unless would-be purchasers are convinced to not spend on 
alternative products, an outcome that is especially implausible for DCs, which often 
rely on imported intermediary products and capital goods (Wolf, 1987). Since DCs are 
reliant on imported goods, reducing the scarcity of a good through restrictions brings 
about a rise in price. That is to say that restrictions implicitly tax exports, thereby 
harming export competitiveness while ignoring the true cause of the imbalance: the 
difference between national output and expenditure (Lerner, 1936). 
Restrictions fail to alter the original imbalance or even to reverse deterioration of 
the BOP (Eglin, 1987, 3). Ideally, the costs are minimized due to a temporary 
reduction in imports, as illustrated occasionally by European developed countries in 
the 1950s during post-war reconstruction. Unlike those countries, DCs have possessed 
neither the other required macroeconomic fundamentals nor the capacity to make 
macroeconomic adjustments. As a result, DCs have been more likely to face a 
permanent drop in output, productivity and ultimately welfare, hindering economic 
development efforts while leaving them still in a weak position in terms of BOP. 
Overall, trade restrictions fail to address the main problem of disequilibrium in the 
BOP, and they create a perverse incentive system, making them a weak tool to 
promote development. 
3. Poorly Designed Preferential Policies 
3.1 Problematic Protection 
n addition to the weak underlying rationale for the use of Article XVIII (B), its 
specific policy design also harmed development opportunities in two ways: first, 
through insufficient oversight and second, by creating opportunities for corruption. 
3.1 (a) No effective oversight mechanism to prevent abuse 
First, a significant weakness in policy design is demonstrated in the ineffectiveness of 
the GATT committee that was created to prevent abuses of Article XVIII (B) and to 
assist DCs in making complex macroeconomic decisions. Although the article stated 
DCs were to meet with the committee to justify impositions under Article XVIII, in 
reality it was only occasionally consulted (Eglin, 1987). Moreover, under the pretence 
that the committee could be seen as infringing on sovereignty, DCs were able to 
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reduce the frequency with which they met with it. In the face of flagrant abuses in the 
form of repeated, unjustified impositions, the committee possessed no sanction ability, 
rarely concluded the misuse of Article XVIII to be illegitimate, and never assigned 
punitive actions (Eglin, 1987). Thus, poor policy design permitted systemic misuse. 
3.1 (b) Creating opportunities for corruption 
A second weakness of Article XVIII (B) was that it created incentives for corruption, 
as demonstrated through two related elements: a) DCs were allowed full discretion to 
select which products would be subject to restrictions, and b) import and export 
licenses were granted on a discretionary basis. Opportunities were thus provided to 
narrow interest groups who sought to increase the economic rents made available to 
them by bribing program administrators and officials (Elliott, 1997). Given that 
preferences create a strong incentive for interest groups to capture preferential 
policies, they also undermine DC governments, as governments lose the “ability … to 
stand up to their own domestic protectionist pressures” (Sutherland et al., 2004, 25). 
Insofar as restrictions had the effect “of fostering thoroughly corrupt and corrupting 
trade regimes,” their usefulness in facilitating development was weakened (Hart & 
Dymond, 2003, 397). 
Although safeguards were built in through consultation and monitoring with 
GATT officials, in reality consultation and monitoring of Article XVIII (B) was both 
irregular and lacking in consistency due to poor policy design. Consultations were 
relatively expensive, increasing the transaction costs borne by the applying DC and 
thereby reducing the incentive to take part in such a process. More importantly, 
preferential policies gave rise to moral hazard concerns through the creation of 
principal-agent problems: given that the consultation process was designed to occur 
after DCs’ BOP had attained problematic levels, a perverse incentive existed for DCs 
to maintain foreign exchange balances at levels lower than those that would cause 
currency crises.  As Furtan argues, if economic agents know that trade restrictions can 
be placed on imports if foreign reserves fall, then the government may hold a lower 
than equilibrium level of foreign exchange. If the level of foreign exchange is lowered 
through government action due to the availability of Article XVIII (B), then the 
possibility of moral hazard exists (1990, 9). 
Overall, the policies for restrictions provide corruption incentives and open the 
door to moral hazard decisions, undermining development efforts. 
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3.2 Policy Oversights in the Generalized System of 
Preferences 
Poor program design meant that the GSP programs were only superficially geared 
toward facilitating development. In an era of reductions to budget allocations for aid 
programs, GSP schemes were considered a cheaper alternative than providing direct 
funds, which allowed them to become influenced by the politics of aid, that is to say 
to become tightly controlled and defined to suit developed-country agendas 
(Bhagwati, Krueger and Snape, 1987). As Bhagwati argues, GSP programs are a 
poisoned chalice in that “product eligibility is limited, the preferences terminate when 
exports are successful, and reverse preferences for the rich countries are almost 
always built into these schemes” (2005, 27). 
3.2 (a) GSP policy design flaws – unilateral and non-binding 
Fundamentally, unlike MFN commitments in the GATT, GSP programs are 
unilaterally offered, non-binding and revocable depending solely on the political 
inclination of granting countries. GSP schemes also have clauses that terminate their 
application when quotas are filled (Ozden and Reinhardt, 2005). Being unilateral, 
GSPs are not offered on economic-based criteria, a situation that has allowed 
developed countries complete control to decide the eligibility of beneficiaries. These 
design flaws have also allowed developed countries to cunningly use the threat of 
GSP non-renewal as a bargaining chip to pressure beneficiaries to alter their policies 
in exchange for remaining eligible for preferences (Hart and Dymond, 2003). In being 
forced to accept conditions, DCs are “burdened with obligations unrelated to trade. … 
Thus it can be argued, preferences are no longer unreciprocated” (Sutherland et al., 
2004, 24). To illustrate, DCs have been denied beneficiary status for “communism, 
terrorism, violations of human or workers’ rights or membership in the Organization 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries” as well as for domestic environmental policies 
(MacPhee and Ogueldo, 1991, 19). 
Developed countries also select which products to include, excluding the most 
important products to DCs: agriculture, textiles and low-technology goods. Cline’s 
(2004) data showed that the largest tariff-preference margins were applied to products 
that were previously subject to low tariffs, averaging 6 percent. Furthermore, tariff-
peak products were subject to considerably lower preferential margins, ranging from 
16 percent in the United States to 20 percent in the EEC and 23 percent in Japan. This 
evidence confirms that such schemes are weakened by eligible products. The literature 
identifies the forgone tariff revenue compared to the import base as a key indicator of 
the power of a GSP program. In this instance, the incentives provided by the GSP 
programs are marginal: 0.57 for the EEC and 0.2 for Japan and the United States Andrew Christie 
Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy                 ____________   70 
 
(Cline 2004, 74). This means that actual price advantages averaged under half a 
percent, thereby failing to induce sizeable incentives for increased investment. 
Sutherland et al. (2004, 25) demonstrate that the EEC’s GSP regime is indicative 
of grantor interests influencing the program so as to substantially reduce any benefits 
that may accrue to DCs. “Some tariff quotas were so tight that they were filled within 
the first three days of each year. Others, for jet aircraft for example, were not taken up 
at all” (Sutherland et al., 2004, 25). When such programs are announced, the inclusion 
of such unreasonable products skews the apparent size of benefits available to DCs. 
As a result and contrary to the intended goal of GSP schemes to attract foreign capital, 
a stable investment climate is not facilitated (Jackson, 1990). The Caribbean Basin 
Initiative (CBI), permitted under S&DT policies, is an apt example. A decade after the 
debut of the program, economic growth was still anaemic in beneficiary countries, and 
the growth of imported goods eligible under the CBI in absolute terms was smaller 
than that of non-eligible goods, suggesting that product eligibility limitations 
weakened its effects (Dypski, 2002). On balance, the unilateral and non-binding 
nature of GSP schemes detracts from the economic development goals S&DT is 
purported to support. 
3.2 (b) GSP policy design flaws – developed-country lobbies 
The non–trade related agenda conditions that GSP beneficiaries must subscribe to 
“introduce clout for advancing what are principally developed-country lobbying 
agendas” (Sutherland et al., 2004, 25). These agendas aim to reduce the economic 
competitiveness of international producers by increasing production costs and 
reducing investment flows, masking their protectionist interests behind labour rights 
causes. For example, the GSP labour rights amendment was passed in 1984, allowing 
organizations to petition the U.S. government to review if a beneficiary country is not 
respecting labour rights. The thin protectionist veil is revealed in the process and 
resulting data. First, the key measurement used by the law is whether beneficiaries are 
“taking steps” rather than full compliance with relevant standards, providing 
significant discretion for protectionist causes (Hepple, 2005). From the time of its 
implementation until 1995, over 80 reviews occurred, with the most active petitioners 
being the AFL-CIO and other large unions. In a comprehensive study spanning fifteen 
years of GSP schemes under the GATT, Compa and Vogt conclude that “the merits of 
a petition have little bearing on a case. Geopolitics and foreign policy are the chief 
considerations … not the merits of a country’s compliance or non-compliance (of 
perceived violations)” (2001, 236). 
The United States’ withdrawal of Chile from its GSP program in 1987 under the 
pretence of violations of workers’ rights is indicative of this trend, as in reality U.S. Andrew Christie 
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labour interests had exerted pressure to advance their protectionist interests through 
the mechanism described above (Sutherland et al., 2004). Concerning the CBI, even in 
those areas of comparative advantage, most notably sugar and related products, the 
minority protectionist interests of sugar producers in the United States were able to 
subvert these preferences, minimizing sugar imports to the extent that that sugar 
quotas were actually reduced during the duration of the program (Dypski, 2002). The 
United States also revoked a GSP scheme on $60 million worth of Indian 
pharmaceutical products that were prepared for export in 1992. The rationale 
employed was that India had insufficient protection for intellectual property, an issue 
on which there was no agreement at the time. More importantly, the U.S. 
pharmaceutical industry lobbied the U.S. government to send a signal to DCs who 
were wavering on intellectual property issues in the Uruguay Round negotiations 
(Sutherland et al., 2004, 25). These standards related to labour and intellectual 
property comprise the very nature of the comparative advantage DCs possess in the 
global trading system; mechanisms to reduce this advantage therefore work against 
their economic development interests. 
3.3 Administrative Costs 
GSP schemes are often based on rules-of-origin requirements, which comprise the 
criteria upon which the source of a product is determined, an important consideration 
for DCs attempting to facilitate domestic exporting to developed countries. While 
substantial transformation of a product into another product is almost universally 
recognized, a specific provision was never agreed upon in the GATT. For instance, 
minimum value-added percentages are often required to have taken place in the 
beneficiary country. 
Implementation of these regimes has proved costly; economic resources are spent 
satisfying the requirements to ensure and demonstrate that production occurs in 
beneficiary countries and is not deflected from a non-beneficiary country to avoid 
duties, effectively reducing the ability of DCs to use preferences. These rule structures 
are often complex, with extremely detailed legal texts, and compliance with them 
demands substantial administrative resources (FAO, 2001). 
There are two additional flaws that harm DC interests (Lahoud, 1982, 37-38). 
First, indirect domestic value-added components, such as management costs, overhead 
and profit, are not included in the calculation of valuation within the rules-of-origin 
requirement, meaning that despite the sizeable degree of transformation outside the 
industrial realm, GSP schemes risk denying the eligibility of these goods. Second, 
indirect production costs not counted within the minimum value-added requirement Andrew Christie 
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mean that even if a product is entirely made in an eligible beneficiary country, and 
thus satisfies the intended goal of the GSP, it may still be ineligible. 
These problems work against the goals of GSP programs to diversify exports and 
provide incentives for export expansion and ultimately facilitate economic 
development. Often, “depending on the size of the preference margin, the costs of 
implementing the rules of origin may actually be larger than the value of the 
preference” (FAO, 2001). The result is indicative of the failure of preferences to 
promote development; preferential regimes are simply ignored because rules of origin 
have become onerous. Francois, Hoekman and Manchin (2006) estimate that 
administrative burdens from rules-of-origin requirements are equivalent to 4 percent 
of the overall value of traded goods. This has resulted in preferences being 
significantly underused. These practical considerations substantially reduce the utility 
of these regimes for economic development purposes. 
4. Preferences as a “Faustian Bargain” (World Bank 
1987, 167) 
he underlying assumption that DCs have doubly benefited by not having to 
implement tariff concessions to the same extent as developed countries while at 
the same time attaining rights to preferences beyond those of other GATT members is 
a misconception and undermines the interests of DCs. This assumption overlooks the 
hidden costs commensurate with securing S&DT arrangements as reflected in the 
economic concept of opportunity cost, where an equally desirable choice is given up 
to attain a certain desirable outcome (Eatwell, Milgate and Newman, 1987, 718-720). 
DCs faced a choice between two desirable, yet mutually exclusive, outcomes: 
pursuing preferential regimes or participating as full GATT members and thereby 
assuming the responsibilities to make reciprocal tariff concessions. 
As Hoekman, Michalopoulos and Winters argue, “reciprocity is the engine of the 
WTO; it is not engaging in reciprocal exchange of market access concessions that has 
helped create the … structure of protection confronting developing countries” (2003, 
8). The hidden cost of pursuing preferential agreements was the forgone negotiating 
capital that would advance DCs’ interests in an MFN context. The relentless pursuit of 
preferences relegated DCs to a secondary division of lesser actors within the GATT. 
DCs also became easy targets for discriminatory policies, cynically referred to as 
reverse discrimination because these policies effectively favoured developed countries 
(Hart and Dymond, 2003). Developed countries recognized that DCs had used their 
negotiating capital to push for S&DT and thus forced extra-GATT agreements onto 
them. Securing non-reciprocity and other forms of S&DT in multilateral negotiations 
“actually placed (DCs) in a weaker position to combat GATT-inconsistent barriers in 
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developed countries against their exports” (Srinivasan, 1998, 24). The pursuit of 
S&DT at the cost of discriminatory regimes reflects the Faustian bargain DCs made. 
4.1 Evidence Supporting the Presence of a Faustian Bargain 
Evidence corroborates the above argument insofar as DC interests for the 
liberalization of exports within their respective comparative advantages were ignored. 
Finger (1979) demonstrates this empirically by analyzing tariff liberalization through 
concessions made in the Kennedy Round. He reveals that the lower the degree of 
participation in GATT negotiations, the lower is the commensurate share of benefits 
for that group’s exports to the United States. For instance, whereas the DCs active in 
negotiations and generally not pursuing preferences often received concessions on up 
to 33 percent of their exports, those DCs that offered few reciprocal concessions 
received concessions on a paltry 5 percent of their exports. These data are especially 
stark in comparison to data for major U.S. trading partners, which received import 
tariff reductions on 70 percent of their goods (Finger, 1979). As Srinivasan argues, the 
trade-off DCs faced in securing preferences was to allow developed countries to retain 
“higher than average MFN tariffs on goods of export interest to developing countries” 
(1998, 26). 
Following the 1954-1955 GATT Review Session, which created the initial S&DT 
measures, developed countries began to protect their domestic industries due to 
concerns about market disruption. Indeed, the GATT had envisioned such scenarios in 
creating Article XIX, which allowed countries to take safeguard action in the event of 
a flood of imports while allowing other GATT members to retaliate by rescinding 
prior market access concessions. Since DCs were being granted non–MFN based 
preferences, developed countries created agreements outside of the GATT in areas of 
particular export interest to DCs. For instance, DCs were forced to accept export 
quotas, and the type and quality of textiles that were eligible for export were limited 
through the 1961 Short Term Agreement and the 1962 Long Term Agreement (LTA). 
Both were in direct violation of GATT principles. 
As the scope for S&DT expanded in the 1960s following the Kennedy Round and 
the subsequent creation of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), the LTA was continually renewed. In 1974, in a period when the DCs 
were benefiting from non-reciprocal market access through the Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSPs) and using import restrictions based on BOP justifications, the 
Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) was created to expand the number of textile and 
clothing products considered GATT ineligible. In total, three separate agreements 
were created along with nine extensions, all of them favourable to developed 
countries. Further data show these agreements to be particularly galling in that textiles Andrew Christie 
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represented less than 2 percent of total employment in the United States, whereas 
protection for it accounted for 83 percent of the overall cost to the United States 
among all import restrictions (Krueger, 1996). Underscoring the effects of these 
restrictions on DCs, Cline (1990) found that by 1986 quotas represented tariffs of 28 
percent on textiles and 53 percent on apparel. By comparison, tariffs on goods that 
were negotiated in the GATT-led MFN context had dropped to less than 8 percent 
(Irwin, 1995). Developed countries shrewdly allowed DCs the rights to administer the 
distribution of quotas to ensure that narrow political interests in DCs would not voice 
any opposition in earnest. As participants in negotiations, industrialized rich countries 
were able to virtually dictate the terms surrounding products of substantial market 
interest for DCs. While the textile industry was protected through voluntary export 
restraints (VERs), other low-technology goods were similarly protected by expanding 
GATT exemptions and orderly marketing agreements (OMAs). This is supported 
empirically, as overall tariffs on low technology, labour intensive and agricultural 
goods are on average ten to twenty times larger than entry tariffs on products not 
excluded from GATT negotiations (Krueger, 1996). In sum, preferential measures 
failed DCs, given the significant costs encountered in return, evidenced by 
relinquished market access for their exports. DCs chose to forgo the benefits of the 
GATT, warts and all, at their peril. 
4.2 MFN Compared to S&DT 
Implicitly, the critiques above assume that the forgone option – participation in the 
MFN negotiations – would have yielded better outcomes. Empirical analysis strongly 
suggests that, over the period since the creation of GSP programs in the European 
Economic Community (EEC) and Japan in 1971 and in the United States in 1975, 
DCs have stood to gain more from benefits derived through MFN concessions than 
from benefits created by GSP schemes. The data in table 1 show estimated increases 
in trade flows from GSP schemes and MFN cuts as well as the estimated costs of 
preference erosion. Although results vary, the trend clearly shows that estimated 
benefits associated with MFN are considerably higher than those associated with GSP 
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Table 1 Global Trade Benefits of GSP Schemes Compared to Trade Benefits from MFN Cuts 
($ millions) 
 
Study GSP  MFN*  Cost  of  Erosion 
Baldwin and Murray (1977)  479  848  32 
Iqbal (1975)  380  NA  NA 
Cline et al. (1978)  NA  2640  NA 
UNCTAD (1979)  NA  1700  2100 
Birnberg (1979)  NA  1446  93 
Ginman, Pugel and Walter (1979)  NA  900  1800 
Deardorff and Stern (1983)  NA  173  NA 
Sapir (1981)  2139  NA  NA 
Source: Ahmad, 1985, 1078 
* These studies estimated MFN cuts to be roughly equivalent to Kennedy Round cuts of 50 
percent. 
An additional element that weakens GSP schemes is the fact that, as was 
discussed in section three above, MFN cuts are bound whereas GSP schemes are 
revocable; thus, GSP results tend to be reduced over time (Ahmad, 1985). It should 
also be reiterated that benefits of the GSP regimes are largely concentrated among a 
small number of DCs, again signalling that the vast majority of DCs do not benefit 
from preferential schemes, contrary to the case with MFN cuts that are applied to all 
DCs. 
5. Conclusion 
hile GATT legal scholar John Jackson characterized preferential measures 
toward DCs as “aspirational” in attempting to facilitate development (1989, 
275), this article exposes their weak theoretical underpinnings and policy design flaws 
and concludes that such efforts have provided few benefits for DCs. Arguments by 
critical scholars that the economic structure would perpetually favour developed 
countries became fashionable in policy circles and were translated into demands for 
discriminatory preferences. As a result, developed countries assumed obligations 
while DCs were granted a separate set of rights as demonstrated by the unique 
availability of Article XVIII (B). Preferences spread with viral efficacy within the 
GATT, as indicated by “[l]ax enforcement, pro forma consultations, and indifferent 
notification …” (Hart and Dymond, 2003, 415). 
Conceptually, however, the demands on the part of DCs for discriminatory 
measures gave license to developed countries to participate in extremely harmful 
discrimination despite direct contradiction of GATT rules. “By insisting they had 
rights but no obligations, developing countries surrendered their capacity to pursue 
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those rights with any significant results” (Hart and Dymond, 2003, 415). Empirical 
analysis reinforces that MFN obligations, while politically unpalatable, may have 
been a more potent strategy for pursuing economic growth. In addition, S&DT 
policies themselves were often poorly designed, giving rise to rent-seeking behaviour, 
moral hazard concerns and cumbersome administrative costs. 
In short, DCs secured a pyrrhic victory not only because they obtained 
preferential schemes that were poorly designed, but also, and more fundamentally, 
because the existence of these schemes gave license to developed countries to ignore 
DCs’ negotiation demands in multilateral settings concerning their key levers of 
economic growth – tariff and subsidy reductions in their areas of comparative 
advantage. Andrew Christie 
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